Introduction
The UN-supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG) currently faces a strong and credible threat to its survival from the radical Islamist group, al Shabaab. Al Shabaab already controls most of southern Somalia, and Mogadishu is the only major city with a significant TFG presence. Al Shabaab has restricted the government’s ability to operate even within the capital, confining the TFG’s area of control to the few blocks surrounding government buildings. The lack of security in Mogadishu also deters members of parliament from attending sessions, further eroding the significance and the already tenuous effectiveness of the government. The fall of the TFG would eliminate the last vestige of a Somali state and leave a terrorist group with strong ties to al Qaeda in a position to claim control of the country’s capital—the first time an Islamist group would have taken control of a national capital since the Taliban took Kabul in 1996.
The TFG cannot defend itself. It survives only because the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), a peacekeeping force established by the African Union (AU) in January 2007, protects it. The terms of AMISOM’s mandate severely impede the troops’ ability to combat al Shabaab, however, restricting the force to protecting primary government infrastructure and the main supply route.
Al Shabaab launched a major ongoing offensive against the TFG and AMISOM during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan (August 11 – September 9). This offensive challenges AMISOM’s positions throughout Mogadishu and has come close to cutting off the TFG and some AMISOM units.
he threat is very serious. Al Shabaab has a presence throughout most of Mogadishu’s districts, controls nearly all of the main roads, and has expanded its safe zone in the city since the beginning of the year. The AMISOM peacekeeping force has not been able to protect the population. Mogadishu residents have borne the brunt of the fighting—the majority of the casualties have been civilians killed by shelling by both sides. Moreover, increased violence has shut down business in certain areas of Mogadishu, including the main market, Bakara, for the first week of the offensive and at irregular intervals since the beginning of September.[1] The UN estimated in late October that over 50,900 people have been displaced in Mogadishu, 30,100 of whom have left the capital since the start of the al Shabaab Ramadan offensive.[2] Al Shabaab’s offensive could push the TFG and AMISOM to the brink of collapse or even destroy the TFG entirely.
The prospect of al Shabaab taking control of Mogadishu is alarming and requires a much more careful examination of Western policies toward the Horn of Africa than they have so far received. But the details of the potential collapse of the TFG need even more urgent consideration. Even if the TFG can be saved, it is quite possible that military exigencies on the ground in the coming weeks or months will lead to requests for external military assistance by AMISOM forces. The U.S. may well face some difficult choices. We would do well to examine some of the most likely challenges and consider beforehand what our responses should be.
Al Shabaab’s Ramadan Offensive
Al Shabaab, supported by Hizb al Islam, is currently waging an aggressive offensive with the goal of taking control of all of Mogadishu. Al Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamed Rage, also known as Sheikh Ali Dhere, announced the Ramadan 
offensive during a press conference on August 23 saying that al Shabaab militants “will continue [fighting] until Allah’s wish is fulfilled. The enemy will face larger attacks from now on. This operation is meant to eliminate the invading Christians and their apostate government in Somalia.”[14] The night that Rage announced the offensive, militants attacked government and AMISOM barracks in Hodan and Bondhere districts in Mogadishu.[15] Mid-morning on August 24, al Shabaab militants disguised in government uniforms carrying guns and wearing suicide vests stormed the Muna Hotel, only blocks from Villa Somalia and often frequented by members of parliament and government officials.[16] The militants went through the building room by room, and only after government troops had surrounded the militants did they detonate their vests. The attack killed at least 32 people, including four MPs.[17] The Muna Hotel attack is one of the large-scale attacks in Mogadishu that Rage had promised just the evening before, and it heralded a new style of attack for al Shabaab. Previous attacks, such as the September 17, 2009 twin suicide bombings of AMISOM headquarters and the December 3, 2009 suicide bombing of a graduation ceremony, relied solely on explosives to inflict damage.[18] At the Muna Hotel, militants fought security forces for some time before detonating their explosives.
The al Shabaab offensive takes a two-pronged approach that couples a higher level of violence within Mogadishu with periodic high-value attacks. The ground operations target strategic positions in the capital.[19] Al Shabaab militants engaged AMISOM soldiers along the Makka al Mukarama road in an attempt to gain control of the supply route. The road runs between the Villa Somalia and the airport. Sheikh Abdi Aziz Abu Mus’ab, al Shabaab’s military operations spokesman, said on August 25 that Makka al Mukarama road was the only major transportation route under government control and “with the assistance of Allah’s power, our fighters cut off that road today and the enemy cannot move between their positions.”[20] In addition to attempting to seize control of major logistics routes, al Shabaab has also worked to disrupt TFG and AMISOM convoys using roadside IEDs.[21] Al Shabaab has also had limited success attacking government positions with mortars. On August 30, a mortar fired at Villa Somalia landed near a Ugandan AMISOM base inside the compound and killed four soldiers.[22] A second mortar attack on September 18 during a session of parliament wounded one lawmaker.[23]
Large-scale attacks on key government infrastructure and personnel demonstrate the inability of AMISOM or the TFG to secure even limited territory in the capital. On September 9, al Shabaab attacked the Aden Adde International Airport just 40 minutes after the departure of a high-level UN delegation. Two militants successfully broke through the airport’s defenses and were “brought to a halt within 200 meters (yards) of the terminal building where they exploded their IED (improvised explosive device) vests,” according to an African Union statement.[24] Two days later, al Shabaab attacked the seaport.[25] On September 20 an al Shabaab militant carrying an automatic rifle jumped onto the back of an armored AMISOM vehicle in a convoy entering Villa Somalia. Security guards opened fire on the militant, who threw a grenade at them and then detonated a suicide vest.[26] The moderate success of these attacks in infiltrating a presumably secure area shows that al Shabaab is fully capable of executing an attack on a high-value target that could severely impact the TFG or AMISOM. The evidence indicates that the group has prepared for such attacks throughout this offensive—a premature detonation of two vehicle-borne IEDs killed nine al Shabaab militants, including an imam, on August 21.[27]
Tough Decisions
The progress al Shabaab has made and the near-success of several large-scale attacks on vital locations in Mogadishu make a catastrophic attack on the TFG or AMISOM to which those forces could not respond with the resources available to them a serious possibility. The tenuousness of the TFG today means that any successful major attack could put its existence on the line, threatening to remove the international community’s only partner in the fight against al Shabaab. Such an attack would likely manifest itself suddenly, forcing decisions to be made at short notice and increasing the likelihood that the U.S. response would be tactical and spasmodic rather than strategic. It is essential, therefore, to consider the possible most dangerous scenarios and the decision-points they would present to Washington and the world.
An analysis of al Shabaab’s current offensive and the posture of the TFG and AMISOM forces suggest four likely scenarios that would require rapid and decisive action from the U.S.: 1) al Shabaab militants surround an AMISOM contingent; 2) al Shabaab cuts off the supply routes to TFG or AMISOM positions; 3) al Shabaab lays siege to Villa Somalia or a primary government structure; and 4) al Shabaab executes a second successful international attack.
